

# Coercive Isomorphism in Bureaucratic Reform in Tanimbar Islands Regency

Telly Muriani<sup>1\*</sup>, Vactor S. Ruhunlela<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1,2</sup> Ilmu Pemerintahan, Universitas Darusalam, Ilmu Pemerintahan, Universitas Pattimura, Indonesia

\* Corresponding Author:

Email: [tellymuriany@yahoo.com](mailto:tellymuriany@yahoo.com)

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## Abstrak

*The Tanimbar Islands Regency has several contradictions with the idea of bureaucratic reform designed by the state, leading to coercive isomorphism in organizational changes due to external pressures. This study employs a qualitative approach with a case study method, gathering data through interviews and document studies. The results indicate that: first, institutional reform will only succeed if there is fairness in resource distribution, both in budget and infrastructure, and if political intervention is minimized to enhance the independence of the existing structures, both regional and functional. This independence can only be achieved by strengthening the capacity of the apparatus in structured performance management based on measurable goal achievements. Second, governance system improvements will not be effective without reforming the mentality of the officials, as improving mentality can maximize compliance with policies and procedures, reducing compromises and formalities in the bureaucracy. Third, in a coercive environment, local governments adjust the qualifications of officials merely to meet the demands of professional image and formality. Fourth, an orientation towards practical politics affects the non-simultaneous bureaucratic reform process and hinders inter-agency coordination.*

**Keywords:** *Coercive Isomorphism, Institutional, and Bureaucratic Reform.*

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## I. INTRODUCTION

To carry out bureaucratic reform in the Tanimbar Islands Regency, the local government collaborates with the Pusat Inovasi Kelembagaan dan Sumber Daya Aparatur (PIKSA) and Pusat Kajian Reformasi Administrasi (PKRA) LAN to accelerate bureaucratic reform in the region. The main issue currently is that the regency consists of geographically isolated islands, resulting in low mobility of people, goods, and services, which directly affects the quality of public services at the sub-district level. Bureaucratic reform is an effort to renew and fundamentally change the government administration system, particularly concerning institutional aspects. Various problems/obstacles causing the government administration system at both central and regional levels to not function properly or are predicted not to function well must be restructured or renewed. Therefore, the state, through the National Administration Agency, has formulated bureaucratic reform guidelines to improve organizational performance. However, there are conceptual challenges in bureaucratic reform when these ideas originate from the central government, as the high standards are not matched by the regions' capabilities.

Organizations are formed by their surrounding institutional environment, where influential ideas become institutionalized and are accepted as the organization's way of thinking. However, in developing countries, mental attitudes and behaviors are crucial for organizational success. To address this, the state has created bureaucratic reform guidelines to improve organizational performance in the regions. However, organizations in the regions often struggle to accelerate with the state's reform concepts. In the Tanimbar Islands Regency, there are several contradictions to the reform ideas proposed by the state, including the maintained status quo resulting from centralistic political processes, patrimonial culture and organizational exclusivity reducing values towards good governance, entrenched integrity issues and nepotism, bureaucratic politicization as a negative consequence of the electoral system, and the capacity of officials hindering successful bureaucratic reform, influenced by a tendency to maintain the status quo. These conditions indicate coercive tendencies in isomorphic patterns within the institutional framework, where bureaucratic reform is one such manifestation.

## II. METHODS

This study uses a qualitative approach with a case study of bureaucratic reform in public service in the Tanimbar Islands Regency. Case studies are often conducted on policy analysis, program implementation processes, and organizational changes. The research type is explanatory, analyzing collected data descriptively to explain the observed phenomena. Two types of data sources are used: data from informants selected through purposive sampling, including the Regent of the Tanimbar Islands, sub-district heads, government officials (department heads), and members of the Regional People's Representative Council, supported by secondary data from relevant documents.

## III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### A. Institutional Reform

The study on institutional reform in the Tanimbar Islands Regency focuses on four aspects: (a) decentralization of authority, (b) bureaucratic structure, (c) function of authority, and (d) use of information and communication technology.

#### a) *Decentralization of Authority*

Decentralization of authority or the transfer of authority to the local government to manage public-oriented programs is implemented. However, in practice, decentralization is less responsive due to limited local government support and funding to address proposed programs, such as women's empowerment and community economy. Furthermore, decentralization is not optimal because planning and budgeting are fully controlled by the local government, and there is a lack of responsiveness to sub-district proposals, with indications of prioritization based on election results. In some cases, the authority of sub-district governments is dictated by the regent's tendency to accommodate electoral interests, limiting specific authorities based on campaign designs and strategies. Despite being accommodated in regulations, decentralization of authority is contradicted by political control over the bureaucracy. Unequal budget allocation and prioritization of election-winning regions significantly influence the flexibility of decentralization.

#### b) *Bureaucratic Structure*

Bureaucratic reform at the local government level includes reorganizing local government structures, as mandated by Government Regulation No. 41 of 2007. The structure should ideally depict how the organization is arranged for efficiency, correlating the structure's capacity with the organization's goals and means to achieve them. In the Tanimbar Islands, the bureaucratic structure remains lean but functionally rich, with unclear task specialization and weak employee capacity in filling bureaucratic positions. This complexity in managing bureaucratic affairs is not supported by organizational management expertise, leading to increased workloads, influencing work priorities, and performance achievement.

#### c) *Function of Authority*

Ideally, each organizational unit in carrying out its duties is based on certain expertise / and or skills to achieve maximum goals and has independence in its implementation. The completion of tasks is constrained due to the uneven distribution of tasks and not on target, where the workload is excessive so that it reduces performance, and the like and dislike factor still affects the exercise of authority and goes both ways. Thus the level of differentiation or division of labor that exists in the organization both hierarchically and in scattered organizational units is inversely proportional to the capacity of the bureaucracy that fills positions so that there is often an overlap of authority or weakening of performance.

#### d) *Information Technology*

Information technology enhances two-way communication, significantly affecting coordination to improve work effectiveness and efficiency. However, the main obstacle is the infrastructure, with insufficient funding affecting communication and coordination systems, leading to limited public information access. The implementation of information technology, directed towards an e-government model, without adequate preparation and infrastructure support, causes stagnation. This correlates with limited public access to IT, affecting coordination tasks. Based on these findings, the author concludes that institutional reform will only

succeed with equitable resource distribution, minimized political intervention, and enhanced apparatus capacity in structured performance management based on measurable goals.

In relation to institutional theory, coercive isomorphism occurs when organizations succumb to formal or informal external pressures from other organizations they depend on or societal cultural expectations. The most notable example of this mechanism is government actions towards organizations through laws, norms, and demands related to production patterns, organizational behavior, and consumer relations. Historical evidence shows that bureaucratic reform in Indonesia is still a result of central interventions directed by state institutions, posing challenges for regional bureaucracies.

According to Machado-da-Silva, Fonseca, and Fernandes (2000), the weight of each isomorphic mechanism in organizational transformation depends on the socio-cultural history of each society. In democratic societies with a competitive supply of goods and services, coercive pressures are more dominant for success. In contrast, in societies with strong primordial traditions, like Indonesia, coercive mechanisms negatively impact institutional stability. In the specific case of the Tanimbar Islands, formalism where norms in bureaucratic reform and regional institutional realities tend to maintain the status quo, are associated with coercive mechanisms in institutional change dynamics. This primordial condition is reinforced by local electoral systems where elites maintain power relations. Elected political elites, accumulating social capital, easily dictate orientations irrelevant to bureaucratic reform values for short-term interests. It can be said that institutional reform is hindered by the inability of reform norms to politically bind local officials.

Furthermore, institutional reform will only succeed with equitable resource distribution and reduced political intervention to enhance structural independence, both regional and functional. The greater the centralization of resource supply, the more it resembles the dependent organization. Bureaucratic reform in the Tanimbar Islands has lost momentum due to excessive dependency on political officials for resource allocation, eliminating existing independence aspects. In the context of coercive isomorphism, governance reform pressures stem from political influence and central government legitimacy issues, both formal and informal from other organizations. Therefore, government performance in the public sphere decreases under political turmoil and regional public participation. A clear example of this coercive pressure is regulations and laws. In decentralized constitutional systems like Indonesia, it is normal to experience central government pressure on regional governments and subordinate organizations such as government agencies and regional work units, SKPD, and others. An example of this coercive pressure is Presidential Instruction No. 7 of 1999, mandating all government institutions, including regional governments, to report their performance to the central government. This pressure may be maximal in a hierarchical sense but reverses when performance reporting aims to provide accountability to the local community. As a tangible manifestation of successful governance policies down to the grassroots level, the existence of a solid and actively participating community in policy determination and implementation is expected. The community is also expected to supervise government administration. However, in reality, the community remains powerless before the state.

## **B. Governance Reform**

### **a. Accountability**

Accountability will be achieved through the combination of strict systems, strengthened official mentality, and public demand. However, findings indicate that in the Tanimbar Islands, accountability channels exist but are hindered by weak official mentality. Accountability weaknesses are generally found in the bureaucracy executing licensing functions, with poor public oversight and participation. In bureaucratic behavior, procedural and systemic aspects are often seen as formalities that exist only on paper. Therefore, the focus of bureaucratic reform in the local government is on how accountability channels directly target behavioral changes in officials.

### **b. Transparency**

Transparency, or clarity and openness in managing public goods to fulfill public rights to information transparency, relies on IT mastery. Transparency is still understood as procedural clarity, with ineffective communication channels for public use. The bureaucratic reform agenda in the Tanimbar Islands

emphasizes transparency through procedural clarity and public information disclosure. However, this goal faces challenges due to limited IT use and budget constraints for infrastructure improvements.

**c. Monitoring and evaluation**

The clarity of the monitoring and evaluation benchmarks affects the follow-up and results of the evaluation, the biggest record of monitoring and evaluation is Standard Operating Procedures where there are still many symptoms of non-compliance with this, then the results of monitoring and evaluation are often not followed up as a serious matter for organizational governance, then there are still indications of a culture of excuse in organizational management that makes the output of the evaluation results unbiased as material for improvement, there is a tendency to turn a blind eye to deficiencies in organizational management. Supervision and control can only be carried out if there is clarity on evaluation indicators. Whereas the lack of clarity of SOPs and workload does not allow for a measurable evaluation process. As a result, the condition of mutual understanding of limitations makes the results of M&E often not get a follow-up.

**d. Law Enforcement**

Bureaucratic reform is said to be successful if a system of rewards and punishments is implemented and the principle of fairness in fulfilling rights and obligations is met. Law enforcement is contextualized in the fulfillment of the right to public services, so as long as there are service activities, it is considered a legal obligation. This condition is explained in the phrase, "service has been sent, not delivered." There are still social stratifications at work in the context of law enforcement, such as prioritizing certain community groups, especially those with high access to political, economic, and social resources, and a high level of compromise regarding regulations outside discretion or exceeding the tolerance value of legal procedures. The provision of rewards and punishments is neither strict nor balanced. This is intertwined with the mentality, culture of tolerance, and elitist nature of the bureaucracy, impacting law enforcement in terms of both policy substance and procedure. Selective enforcement and unequal distribution of rights are at least influenced by social strata. Internally, the rare issuance of punishments is also due to monitoring and evaluation that is not followed up.

Governance reform cannot be maximized without addressing the mentality of the apparatus, where improving mentality can maximize compliance with policies and procedures and minimize compromise and formality in the bureaucracy. Ultimately, this will impact compliance with procedures, clarify performance evaluation benchmarks, and directly affect the follow-up of monitoring and evaluation. The disparity arises because most local governments in Indonesia depend on financial resources and require recognition through various reward systems from the central government rather than the community. From the discussion above, the author derives several propositions: First, due to the coercive mechanism (coercive isomorphism), governance reform does not target accountability to the public but rather to the central government's evaluation of bureaucratic achievements. Second, governance reform cannot be maximized without addressing the mentality of the apparatus. Third, improving mentality can maximize compliance with policies and procedures and minimize compromise and formality in the bureaucracy. Fourth, compliance with procedures will clarify performance evaluation benchmarks and directly affect the follow-up of monitoring and evaluation.

**C. Reform of Apparatus Resources**

**a. Human Resources Management**

The effectiveness and efficiency of organizational goal achievement are highly determined by the calculation of workload and the capacity of the apparatus. The findings indicate issues with the quantity and quality of human resources, difficulties for superiors in determining the direction and priorities of the organization, non-ideal mutations and promotions, and an overload of work not directly connected to the function. Human resources reform is not yet oriented towards efficiency in goal implementation, even though the organization's ability to manage programs is highly determined by the mapping of the apparatus's competencies in carrying out their work.

**b. Personnel Management**

The suitability of workload and apparatus capacity is highly influenced by the recruitment and placement system within the structure. This is evident from the lack of a merit system, the reliance on honorary workers in all technical affairs, recruitment based on kinship and political orientation, and a mismatch between workload, capacity, and responsibility. Filling bureaucratic and functional positions is not yet based on a merit system. The phenomenon of preferential appointments, bureaucratic placements for political purposes, and honorary recruitment based on kinship illustrate personnel management issues. The failure of bureaucratic reform is significantly influenced by incompetent resources. Competence can be improved with appropriate position placement and organizational learning context that accelerates capacity building when a merit system is applied in human resource management models. However, apparatus reform in a coercive situation leads local governments to adjust qualifications just to meet the demands of a professional and formal image. From the perspective of coercive isomorphism, apparatus in modern organizations with various regulations are required to have specialization accompanied by professional certification. In general conditions, the organization's inability to adjust to institutional regulations is usually followed up by hiring or using specific personnel. Licensing or accreditation requirements usually need to meet a qualification presentation for key positions. Certification is very important as a source of legitimacy. Hence, the need for education always increases according to the job position, even though the relationship between educational goals and productivity is sometimes unclear.

This is more apparent in institutional objects than in technical skills based on effectiveness. Having a certificate or educated apparatus signals to the institutional environment that someone in the bureaucratic structure is a modern, professional, competent worker responsible for using rational criteria in selecting and promoting personnel. The coercive nature that appears in the dimension of personnel reform emphasizes the ideal qualifications that should be possessed by government apparatus down to the lower levels. However, there is a wide gap between human resources at the central and regional levels. This gap, although understood by the central government, demands excessive acceleration beyond the organization's capabilities in the regions. This indicates that local governments, in terms of personnel management, are forced to adjust due to dependence on the central government. Baron (1986), in a similar context, researched changes in personnel management in the United States during World War II. He found that during the war, the government in a liberal country heavily intervened in lower-level organizations under the guise of emergency situations, leading to a centralized government that reduced autonomy from the private sector and other commercial entities. Not only that, but the US, a federal country, also provided strict guidance for states to make adjustments. These agencies changed their internal personnel administration, which was needed by the government in emergency situations. This shows the significant power of the state over organizations. In line with Baron, Dobbin (1988) also indicated similar findings, researching job filling cases. Dobbin created an index comparing personnel numbers to the influence of quantity, integration, and government. His findings support the influence of government on organizations as a form of coercive isomorphism and support aspects mentioned by Baron. Dobbin also studied the adoption by organizations oriented towards structural elements to ensure ongoing processes or used by employees.

What Dobbin revealed shows that the government influences organizations dependent on it, resulting in significant performance declines due to shock on the apparatus's ability to adjust. Ultimately, due to state pressure, personnel filling is more directed towards formal qualifications without significant competency improvement. This is evident in the processes and outcomes of government training institutions. The lack of seriousness among the apparatus in education and the principle of "just pass" still reflect the attitudes mentioned by Dobbin and Baron, even though the personnel education management system is designed to ensure quality improvement. However, the demand to meet qualified personnel in the regions ultimately lowers the quality standards of the apparatus. Finally, the success of personnel reform in achieving quality in a coercive model depends on the social structure influencing local governments and the quality of basic human resource education. External power holders, in this case, the central government, must have a clear picture of the organizational capacity to create a conceivable and known model requiring support from local political officials in implementing the institutional blueprint.

Hence, education focused on competence improvement and sustainable specialization can result from a lack of personnel management capacity, despite the imbalance of power between regions and the center. In Maggio and Powell (1983) propose that the more dependent an organization is on academic credentials to select staff, the more it will resemble other organizations. Additionally, the greater the participation of members in professional organizations, the more similar the organization will be. However, in the bureaucratic reform in the Tanimbar Islands Regency, the author finds that: First, the failure of bureaucratic reform is significantly influenced by incompetent resources. Second, competence can be improved with appropriate position placement. Third, organizational learning context accelerates capacity building when a merit system is applied in human resource management models. Fourth, apparatus reform in a coercive situation leads local governments to adjust qualifications just to meet the demands of a professional image.

#### **D. Bureaucratic Relationship Patterns**

##### ***a. Political Response***

Healthy bureaucratic reform requires good working relationship mechanisms or procedures with all elements or components of local government, relevant regional apparatus organizations, and all government and political institutions, in this case, the Regional People's Representative Council of the Tanimbar Islands. Bureaucracy in the region works by responding to political visions and moves simultaneously, where the Regional People's Representative Council needs to be improved through coordination and communication between government institutions, ensuring optimal support for the district government. Thus, political responses are still oriented towards future electoral gains. Political patronage determines priorities in responding to the needs of regional apparatus organizations.

##### ***b. Coordination***

Simultaneous movement in institutional relations implies synergy and synchronization affecting how the coordination process runs. Field findings indicate that coordination is limited to information dissemination and notification. There are symptoms of fear of violating organizational jurisdiction, closed inter-organizational budget management, overlapping authority, and sectoral ego hindering coordination. The closed management of each organization's budget is also a factor. Moreover, the competition for resources and "project budgets" turns coordination principles into competition.

##### ***c. Commitment***

Because it is simultaneous, bureaucratic reform must be based on a high level of commitment and supported by strategic planning. Findings show that the existing commitment is not supported by mature strategic planning. The lack of strategic planning impacts implementation, where high commitment is not backed by planning steps, resulting in commitment often being mere reconciliation material without follow-up.

##### ***d. Consistency***

Planning will only succeed with consistency in implementation from each actor. Findings indicate that the political climate still affects bureaucratic reform consistency, with inconsistent planning and implementation due to mismanagement and program changes due to political intervention. The political climate significantly influences implementation. Political interventions in the execution of planning still occur, directly affecting performance and performance evaluation. Moreover, bureaucratic relationship patterns are still influenced by political patronage as an effect of regional election succession, and orientation towards practical politics affects non-simultaneous regional development goals, thereby affecting or hindering inter-agency coordination, resulting in overlapping authority and sectoral ego. Borrowing the thoughts of B. Guy Peters (2011), the author observes significant political intervention symptoms that directly influence bureaucratic relationship patterns in the Tanimbar Islands Regency. In relation to the influence of a country's politics on the administration conducted by state bureaucracies, Peters divides it into two dimensions based on several political activities performed by a public administrator. The first dimension is internal-external, while the second dimension is formal-informal. This explanation involves political activities within a bureaucracy that seek input from interest groups, partisans, political executives, and a

large number of other sources to formulate policies. On the external side, it concerns bureaucratic political activities aimed at maintaining and developing the organization.

Speaking about the formal nature of politics and bureaucracy, public organizations interact with official government officials. Public organizations also engage with unofficial political actors such as community leaders, lawyers, pressure groups, and similar entities. The distinction between formal and informal nature is often blurred, as there are sometimes unofficial lobbies between public bureaucrats and members of the Regional People's Representative Council, for example, in implementing a development project. Both political dimensions are difficult to separate from the daily activities of state bureaucracies and their bureaucrats. It is challenging to create conditions free from the influence of these two political dimensions. The influence of these dimensions likely causes the bureaucracy's progress to be either hampered or accelerated in achieving bureaucratic reform targets. Regarding the bureaucratic relationship patterns in the reform of the Tanimbar Islands Regency under a coercive isomorphism approach, it can be broadly explained through the homogenization effects that occur when several institutions are forced to make adjustments. In general, the Coercive Concept states that various pressures in terms of power, legal obligations, threats of lawsuits, obtaining legitimacy, financial sources, subordination to the parent organization (in this case, the central government), the need to adapt to an interconnected technical system, and alignment with institutionalized rules require acceptance within the regional organizational structure, encompassing the hierarchy and associated political orientations and policies. These coercive forms can be formal or informal, leading to situational compliance. Often, this search for legitimacy becomes a competition.

The potential of the bureaucratic network as a channel for distributing resources is clearly outlined in the work of Meyer and Rowan. Similarly, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that the growth and elaboration of professional networks spanning organizations contribute to the rapid dissemination of various organizational models. This network is also a crucial component of DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) concept of organizational fields, which emphasize structural equivalence where organizational development depends on increased interaction among organizational components, the development of clear status and function orders, coalition patterns, information exchange enhancement, and mutual awareness in responsive relationships. From DiMaggio and Powell's perspective, the coercive model in isomorphism should form an information exchange pattern that then creates a core and periphery structure that distributes resources, information, and personnel within the organizational field. Ideally, a unified movement emerges when the isomorphic process applies to many organizations under the parent organization, where this pressure demands cooperation to enhance effectiveness and efficiency. However, due to the coercive nature, instead of creating harmonious relations, bureaucratic reform forms a homogenization process, often leading to conflicts in the execution of bureaucratic tasks.

<b>World View</b>	<b>State responsibility (everything that happens is the responsibility of the state where order and prosperity can be achieved through institutions)</b>
<b>Paradigm</b>	<b>New Public Administration</b>
<b>Research domain</b>	<b>Institutional reform/bureaucratic reforms</b>
<b>Grand Theory</b>	<b>Institutional Theory</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Organizational change or formation is due to institutional environmental pressures that cause institutionalization.</li> <li>Organizations are formed by the institutional environment around them. Influential ideas are then institutionalized and considered legitimate and accepted as a way of thinking in the style of the organization.</li> </ul>
<b>Middle range theory</b>	<b>Institutional Isomorphism Theori (Institutional imitation theory)</b> <b>DiMaggio dan Powell (1983)</b> sees three isomorphic institutional formations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>coercive isomorphism: organizations adopt other organizations due to pressures from the state and other organizations or the wider society (organizations are forced to adopt structures or rules)</li> <li>isomorphic mimesis: imitation of one organization by another (copying or imitating another organization, usually due to uncertainty).</li> <li>normative isomorphic, due to professional demands (organizations adopt various forms due to the professional demands of the organization while the organization itself claims that it is an established organization)</li> </ul>
<b>Operational Theory</b>	<b>Coerchive Isomorphis Theories</b>

<p><b>Domain linkage with theory</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bureaucratic reform is an effort to reform and make fundamental changes to the system of government administration, especially regarding institutional aspects.</li> <li>• Various problems / obstacles that result in the system of governance at the central and regional levels not running or are not expected to run well must be reorganized or renewed.</li> <li>• The Indonesian State Administration Institute has revealed a bureaucratic reform formula that guides changes in regional organizations to improve performance quality.</li> <li>• Meanwhile, organizations in the regions have difficulty accelerating with the concept of reform due to several factors: including the status quo work culture, capacity, political system,</li> </ul>			
<p><b>linkage of domain to theory linkage to research locus</b></p>	<p><b>theoretical problem</b></p> <p>Organizations are shaped by the institutional environment around them. Influential ideas are then institutionalized and considered legitimate and accepted as a way of thinking in the style of the organization. it's just that this theory prioritizes rationality and subordinates the concept of mental change and community culture as a secondary component, while in developing countries mental attitudes and behavior are the main components.</p>	<p><b>Conceptual problem</b></p> <p>The state has created a bureaucratic reform formula that guides changes in regional organizations to improve performance quality. Meanwhile, organizations in the regions have difficulty accelerating with the concept of reform by the State.</p>	<p><b>Empirical Problem</b></p> <p>factually, at least some things are observed as contradictions of the idea of reform made by the state.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The status quo that is maintained</li> <li>• Centralized government</li> <li>• Patrimonial culture and organizational exclusivity reduce good governance</li> <li>• Integrity and nepotism practices</li> <li>• Bureaucratic politicization</li> <li>• The capacity of the apparatus makes TANIMBAR ISLAND even more backward in assessing the success of reforming the bureaucracy,</li> <li>• The high standard is inversely proportional to the region's ability to reform the bureaucracy.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Problem Formulation</b></p>	<p><b>How is bureaucratic reform in Tanimbar Islands Regency?</b></p>			
<p><b>Dimensions</b></p>	<p><b>Institutional</b></p>	<p><b>Governance</b></p>	<p><b>Apparatus resources</b></p>	<p><b>Pattern of bureaucratic relations</b></p>
<p><b>Aspect</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• decentralization of authority</li> <li>• Bureaucratic structure</li> <li>• Authority Function</li> <li>• Tech. Communication and Information</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Accountability</li> <li>• Transparency</li> <li>• Monitoring and evaluation</li> <li>• Law enforcement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Human resource management</li> <li>• personnel management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political response</li> <li>• coordination</li> <li>• commitment</li> <li>• consistency</li> </ul>
<p><b>Relevant concepts</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• System of government</li> <li>• public organization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Goodest governance</li> <li>• public service delivery</li> <li>• public ethics</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Human resource management</li> <li>• evelopment management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cooperative governance</li> <li>• public leadership</li> </ul>
<p><b>Sub Indicators</b></p>	<p><b>See Research method matrix</b></p>			
<p><b>Directions/ Questionnaire</b></p>	<p><b>View Research Methods Matrix</b></p>			
<p><b>Finding</b></p>	<p><b>View Matrix Research results</b></p>			
<p><b>Perspective Discussion</b></p>	<p><b>Choerchive Isomorphis Theories :</b>                  due to state demands (organizations adopt other organizations due to state pressures and other organizations or the wider community), institutional change is obtained through 4 adjustments</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Categorical adjustment</li> <li>2. Structural adjustment</li> <li>3. Procedural adjustment</li> <li>4. Personnel adjustment</li> </ol>			
<p><b>Proposition</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Prepositions for institutional reform</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institutional reform will only succeed if there is fairness in the distribution of resources, both budget and organizational infrastructure and weaken political intervention in order to increase the independence of the underlying structures both regionally and functionally.</li> <li>• This independence can only be achieved through strengthening the capacity of the civil service and performance management of the structure based on the achievement of measurable goals.</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Governance reform preposition</b></p>			



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improving the governance system will not run optimally without improving the mentality of the apparatus.</li> <li>• Improving mentality can maximize the level of compliance with policies and procedures and minimize the side of compromise and formality in the bureaucracy.</li> <li>• The level of compliance with procedures will clarify the benchmarks for performance assessment and directly affect the follow-up of monitoring and evaluation.</li> </ul>
<b>Preposition of reforms Apparatus resources</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The failure of bureaucratic reform is strongly influenced by incompetent resources.</li> <li>• Competence can be increased by placing positions in accordance with capacity</li> <li>• The learning context in the organization accelerates each other with capacity building as long as there is a merit system applied in the HR management model.</li> <li>• Apparatus reform In a coercive situation, local governments make adjustments to apparatus qualifications limited to completing the requirements of professional image and formality.</li> </ul>
<b>Preposition of reform Bureaucratic relationship pattern</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The pattern of bureaucratic relations is still influenced by political patrons as an effect of the succession of regional elections.</li> <li>• Orientation to practical politics affects the process of regional development goals that are not simultaneous</li> <li>• The non-simultaneous process hampers coordination between agencies</li> <li>• Directly affects overlapping authority and sectoral ego</li> </ul>

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Coercive characteristics in the bureaucratic reform in Tanimbar Islands Regency result in four key outcomes in the process. First, institutional reform will only succeed if there is fairness in resource distribution, including budget and organizational infrastructure, and a reduction in political intervention to enhance the independence of existing structures both regionally and functionally. This independence can only be achieved through strengthening the capacity of personnel in structured performance management based on measurable goal achievements. Second, the improvement of governance systems cannot be fully realized without addressing the mentality of officials. Reforming mentality can maximize compliance with policies and procedures while reducing compromise and formality within the bureaucracy. Third, coercive reform leads local governments to adjust the qualifications of officials merely to meet the demands of professional and formal image. Fourth, the orientation towards practical politics influences the bureaucratic reform objectives, which are not simultaneous and hinder coordination among agencies.

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