Institutional Optimization Paths for Government Regulation of Platform Capital Irregularities in Live Streaming Economy
DOI:
10.51601/ijersc.v7i4.1048Published:
2026-08-04Downloads
Abstract
With the rapid expansion of live streaming economy, platform capital has penetrated all links of industrial operation. Driven by profit motives, many platform enterprises produce irregular capital behaviors such as predatory investment, exclusive traffic agreements, vicious subsidy competition and data-driven market monopoly, which bring severe challenges to traditional government regulatory framework. Based on regulatory economics theory and platform governance theory, this paper sorts out the typical conflicts between existing regulatory systems and platform capital operation characteristics, analyzes institutional obstacles including regulatory fragmentation, lagging digital rules, inadequate cross-department coordination and weak accountability mechanism. This research focuses on institutional innovation of government supervision, and puts forward targeted optimization paths from perfecting special regulatory laws, building whole-chain capital monitoring system, realizing coordinated multi-department supervision, improving algorithm transparency mechanism and constructing long-term regulatory credit system. The conclusions can provide policy reference for standardizing platform capital and promoting standardized development of live streaming business ecosystem.
References
[1] Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 17(1), 99–120. https://doi.org/10.1177/014920639101700108
[2] Bharadwaj, A., El Sawy, O. A., Pavlou, P. A., & Venkatraman, N. (2013). Digital business strategy. MIS Quarterly, 37(2), 471–482. https://doi.org/10.25300/MISQ/2013/37:2.3
[3] Li, S., & Wang, H. (2025). Capital operation risks of e-commerce live streaming MCN institutions. Journal of Digital Economy Research, 12(3), 78-92.
[4] Liu, Z. (2025). Legal identification of capital irregularities in live streaming industry. Financial Regulation Review, 8(4), 112-127.
[5] Meijerink, J., & Bondarouk, T. (2021). The duality of algorithmic management. Human Resource Management Review, 31, 100722. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hrmr.2021.100722
[6] Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic capabilities. Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), 509–533. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199708)18:7<509::AID-SMJ882>3.0.CO;2-Z
[7] Wang, D., & Ding, B. (2025). The strength of intellectual property protection, corporate financing constraints, and corporate governance efficiency. International Review of Economics & Finance. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2025.104449
[8] Wright, P. M. (1992). Theoretical perspectives for strategic human resource management. Journal of Management, 18(2), 295–320. https://doi.org/10.1177/014920639201800205
[9] Zhang, Y. (2024). The evolution of capital ecology in China’s live streaming industry. Journal of Platform Economy, 9(2), 45-61.
[10] Zott, C. (2003). Dynamic capabilities and the evolution of firm performance. Strategic Management Journal, 24(2), 97–125. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.288.
License
Copyright (c) 2026 International Journal of Educational Research & Social Sciences
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
